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In rfhe Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
SECURITY LEASING COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
VS. 
FLINCO, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant, Respondent and 
Third Party Complaintant, 
vs. 
OFFICE EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATES, a 
corporation and JOHN B. JOHNSON, 
Third Party Defendant. 
Case No. 
11627 
Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant 
ST A TEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover damages for cancel-
lation and breach of certain lease agreements enter-
ed into between plaintiff-appellant Security Leasing 
Company and defendant-respondent Flinco, Inc. 
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The trial court rendered judgment on plaintiff-
appellant' s complaint in favor of defendant-respon-
2 
dent Flinco, Inc., and against plaintiff-respondent 
Security Leasing Company, no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant Security Leasing Company 
seeks reversal of the judgment and requests that this 
court direct the District Court to enter judgment in 
favor of plaintiff-appellant Security Leasing Comp-
any and against defendant-respondent Flinco in 
accordance with the evidence properly presented. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-appellant submits that the facts are best 
set forth in the Statement of Facts in plaintiff-appel-
lant' s brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS EXECUTED BY THE 
PARTIES DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN INTEGRATION, 
I.E. THE FINAL AND COMPLETE EXPRESSION OF 
THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES CONCERNING 
THE LEASED EQUIP1\1ENT. 
In support of defendant-respondent's position 
that the written instruments do not represent the total 
agreement between the parties and thus do not con-
stitute an integration, Flinco bases its argument for 
the admission of parol evidence primarily on two 
propositions; namely (1) the agreements do not des· 
3 
cribe the actual transaction of the parties and (2) the 
written instruments contained a "latent ambiguity." 
As to (1), Flinco argues that "on three material 
matters, the written documents do not describe the 
true and correct understanding. They are (a) relation-
ship of the parties, (b) ownership of the leased equip-
ment, and (c) duty of plaintiff to program and main-
tain the computyper. 
In support of (a) and (b), Flinco, in its Statement 
of Facts, points out that the Master Lease Agreement 
(Exhibit P-1), paragraph 10, provides: 
"Lessee has selected the property to be leased and 
it is ordered by Security Leasing Company for this 
lessee and at lessee's entire discretion and risk. 
Lessor will not be responsible for any repairs, worn 
out and/or replacement parts or defects in the 
equipment." 
Then, Flinco argues that "the undisputed fact is (a) 
Security Leasing was the owner of the equipment 
prior to its installation at Flinco' s place of business, 
(b) it agreed to maintain the equipment for one year, 
(c) it agreed to program the equipment, (d) Flinco 
never saw the equipment until delivery by Johnson 
and (e) the equip!Ilent was never ordered by Secur-
ity Leasinq for Flincc." 
As to (a), (d), and (e), plaintiff-appellant acknow-
ledges these facts to be true but submits that such 
facts were never misrepresented to Flinco and the 
same were known by Flinco when the lease agree-
ment was executed. (R.227-229) Standard lease docu-
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ments, used by Security Leasing in the operation of 
its leasing business, were submitted to Flinco, whose 
manager, after reading the documents and acknow-
ledging his understanding thereof (R.227), executed 1 
the same on behalf of Flinco. If Flinco' s manager had 
considered the wording of paragraph 10, as set forth 
above, material, he should have requested that it be 
modified to reflect the actual facts. Flinco would 
have entered into the lease agreement regardless of 
who owned the computyper and whether Security 
Leasing had ordered the machine or not. This is ob-
vious from the testimony of Mr. Mastelotto, Flinco's 
manager, who stated that he knew Johnson did not 
own the computyper; he knew Friden was the manu-
facturer of the computyper but he knew they did 
not own it; he knew it was a used computyper; and 
he testified that he did not care who owned the 
machine, he would have leased it anyway. (R.220) 
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that such facts are 
immaterial. 
"A fact is material when it influences a person to 
enter into a contract, when it deceives him and in-
duces him to act or when without it the contract (or 
lease) would not have been entered into or the 
transaction not have occurred." 37 Am. Jur. 2d §178. 
Counsel for Flinco pointed out in its brief that 
John Johnson in witnessing the four documents 
which constitute the final and complete expression 
of the agreement, Exhibits P-1, P-2, P-3, and P-4, sign-
ed two as "witness (manufacturer's representative)" 
and two as "witness." It is submitted that this is im-
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rnci.tenal smce Flinco knew that Johnson was simply 
vrit:nessing the execution of the documents and was 
not the "manufacturer's representative" nor was this 
fact ever misrepresented to Flinco. (R.229) 
Counsel for Flinco also pointed out that on 
Exhibit P-4, Lessee's Statement and Completion Cer-
tificate, Office Equipment Associates is listed as the 
vendor. Once aqain, Flinco knew that Office Equip-
ment Associates was not the vendor and even if it 
hrid been Flinco would still have executed the docu-
ment a.nd entered into the lease. (R.229) This fact was 
ne'rer misrepresented to them nor were they induc-
ed by it to enter into the lease and thus it is sub-
mitted that it is immaterial. 
Counsel for Flinco also pointed out in its brief 
that no one signed the lease documents for Security 
Leasing Company, thus attempting to infer that the 
parties had no binding lease agreement or contract. 
"Parties may become bound by the terms of a con-
tract even though they do not sign it, where their 
assent is othenvise indicated, such as by the accept-
ance of benefits under the contract ... The fact that 
one of the parties has signed the contract does not 
necessarily require that the other party should do 
likewise." l 7 Am. Jur. 2d §70. 
It cannot be said that this Lease Agreement 
entered into between Security Leasing Company, as 
lessor, and Flinco, as lessee, was not intended to 
create any legal relations between the parties. Secur-
ity Leasing agreed to lease its equipment to Flinco 
and in consideration therefor, Flinco agreed to pay a 
certain amount per month for 60 months for the use 
of the equipment. The conduct of the parties sub-
sequently in carrying out the terms of the lease for 
16 months directly contradicts any argument that the 
parties did not accept the benefits of the agreement 
or did not intend the lea.se agreement to be binding. 
In Wigmore on Evidence, the author sta.tes: 
"Where a jural act is executed by signing a specific 
and complete docu..rnent, the second party has a right 
to treat the signed contents as representing the 
terms of the act. The principle of resonable conse-
quences plainly requires this result. That the signer 
did not intend to execute such terms is immaterial; 
and whether the lack of intent was due to a failure 
to read it over, or some other cause is immaterial." 
Wigmore on Evidence §2115, p. 44. 
As to (b) and (c), plaintiff-appellant submits that 
it did not agree to maintain the equipment for one 
year or to program the equipment but it only agreed 
to pay for the first year's maintenance and to pay for 
the progra_mming of the equipment which was a p0rt 
of the installation. Exhibit D-6, the Maintenance Con-
tract, clearly shows that Office Equipment Associates 
and John Johnson agreed to maintain the equipment 
for the first year, not Security Leasing Company, and 
Exhibits P-7 and P-8 clearly show that Security Leas-
ing Company paid Office Equipment Associates and 
John Johnson for such maintenance and installation, 
which included programming. 
Exhibit P-1, the Master Lease Agreement, para-
graph 9, provides that the "lessee, at its own cost and 
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3:cpense, shall order and shall furnish all parts, 
mechanisms and devices reo:uired to keep the equip-
ment in good rr:.schanical c.nd working order." Para-
gr0ph 10 provides that the "lessor will not be res-
ponsible for a_nv repc.irs, v1rorn out and/ or replace-
me:r.t pJ.rts, or de+ects in the equipment." The term 
of foe le'lse was for 5 years. The fact that the lessor 
paid for the first year's maintenance on behalf of 
Flinco does not change the responsibilities of the 
p'3rties in this regard as set forth in the lease agree-
rnE:mt. 
Insofar as programming is concerned, Flinco 
argues that "the written instruments do not refer to 
the programming of the computyper. This necessary 
and essential part of the installation of the compu-
typer is nowhere mentioned .... as far as the pro-
qramminq of the computyper is concerned, the writ-
ten documents were incomplete. This creates a lat-
ent ambiguity." Since a la_tenfambiguity exists, Flin-
co argues that pc,rol or extrinsic evidence is admis-
sible as an exception to the parol evidence rule. 
The written instruments which comprise the 
final and complete expression of the parties on the 
le:ise a_greement, that is, Exhibits P-1, P-2, P-3, and 
P-4, do, in fact, refer to the programming of the comp-
utyper. The Lessee's Statement and Completion Cer-
tificate, Exhibit P-4, is a document which relates 
specifically to the "installation and all other work 
ns-cessary" to place the computyper in proper work-
ing order. Fiinco acknowledged in its brief that pro-
gramming was an "essential part of the installation.", 
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and thus it is submitted that there is, in fact, a written 
instrument, executed by Flinco, which concerns pro-
gramming. 
Even if we assume for the sake of argument that 
there existed a latent ambiguity insofar as program-
ming is concerned, and therefore allowed parol testi-
mony as to what the understanding of the parties 
was in this regard, we still have a written instrument 
(Exhibit P-4) which was part of the lease agreement 
wherein Flinco asknowledged on August 2, 1965, 
that, regardless of what the understanding was be-
tween the parties concerning programming "all in-
stallation and other work necessary prior to the use 
thereof (that is, programming) had been completed, 
that the computyper had been examined and/ or test-
ed and was in good operating order and condition 
and was in all respects satisfactory to Flinco and as 
represented and has been accepted by Flinco for the 
purpose of the equipment Lease, dated July 29, 
1965." Therefore, whatever Flinco understood was to 
be accomplished or done insofar as programming 
was concerned, it acknowledged some four days 
after the effective date of the lease that the program-
ming had, in fact, been completed and that it was 
satisfied with it in all respects. 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the 
written instruments executed by the parties, the 
Lease Agreement on the computyper, Exhibit P-1 
and P-2; the Lec.se Agreement on the TCPC Unit, 
Exhibit P-1 and P-3; and the Lessee's Statement and 
Completion Certificate, Exhibit P-4, constituted an 
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integration, that is, the final and complete expression 
of the agreement between the parties, as evidenced 
by the written instruments themselves and the sub-
sequent conduct of the parties in carrying out the 
terms of said written instruments for some 16 months. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS NOT PERFORM-
ED. 
Flinco argues that plaintiff did not supply any 
evidence "which could be a basis of a finding that 
the programming of defendant's business into the 
computyper was completed." 
By the execution of the Lessee's Statement and 
Completion Certificate, Exhibit P-4, Flinco acknow-
ledged that the leased equipment, the computyper, 
had been fully programmed to its satisfaction and 
that it had been accepted for the purpose of the 
lease. Therefore, it is submitted that plaintiff did, in 
fact, complete the programming and fully performed 
its responsibilities under the terms of the lease. 
The only evidence, which Flinco alleges is in 
support of its proposition that plaintiff did not per-
form its !'esponsibilities under the lease, is that evi-
dence which was improperly admitted and in viola-
tion of the parol evidence rule. 
Flinco attempted throughout the trial to raise 
some doubt as to Mr. Johnson's competence as a 
10 
programmer. Two employees of Friden, a competitor 
of Office Equipr.-ient Associates and John Johnson 
(R.100), testified about his competency as a program- , 
mer. Neither one was a programmer; one was a 
salesman and the other was a service manager (R.-
152, 185) No programmer from Friden was called by 
Flin co. 
Mr. Johnson's background and experience in 
programming consisted of the following: In 1957, he 
a.ttended the first two Friden programming schools 
on the Model CTC computyper. Later he went to the 
programming school on the Model CTC computyper 1 
as well as programming schools on two other Friden 
units, the flexowriter and the calculator, both of 
'Nhich form part of the computyper. From 1961 until 
1965, he was the service manager of the San Fran-
cisco office and had 35 service men under his juris-
d:ction. Included among his duties were modifying ' 
programs for his salesmen for customer demonstra-
tion. It was his responsibility to do his own program-
ming of the machines he sold. In 1965 he left Friden 
and his own company, Office Equipment 
Associates, and beca.me a competitor of Friden. Prior , 
to program.ming the computyper at Flinco, he pro-
grammed computypers for Eimco Corporation, Hill 
Air Force Base, 1'.1iller V\Tarehousing Corporation, 
and J. G. !vicDonald Chocolate Company. In addition 
to the above, Mr. Johnson has made special in-depth 
studies in the field of programming for Thiokol 
Chemical Corporation and for Boeing Company. 
(R.323-328) Based upon this background and exper-
J 1 
ience, it c_ppears conclusive that Mr. Johnson was a 
qualified prcgrammer. 
Counsel for defendant-respondent refers to 
Friden's employees, Mr. Rice, a salesman, and Mr. 
Burnett, a service manager, as his "expert witness-
es." These men had far less experience than Mr. 
Johnson a_nd yet both testified that they had modi-
fied existing programs and were aware that Mr. 
Johnson had done the same. (R. 168, 171, 176, 177, 
188, and 189) Mr. Burnett at one time was under the 
supervision of Mr. Johnson and would go to him for 
advice on certain matters including advice on exist-
ing programs. m.185) Mr. Johnson testified that all he 
did in prcgramming the computyper at Flinco was to 
modify an existing program (R.316). 
It should also be pointed out that Mr. Montgom-
ery, a programmer analyst for Sentinel Life Insur-
ance Company, testified that he informed Mr. John-
son as to what information Sentinel's computer 
would need from the computyper in order to pro-
duce the business information Mr. Mastelotto of 
Flinco hcid communicated to Mr. Montgomery that 
Flinco wanted and further that Mr. Johnson pro-
grammed the computyper in such a manner that the 
computyper did, in fact, produce all of this infor-
mation. (R.304-305). 
It is submitted that Mr. Johnson did have the 
requisite background, experience, and qualifications 
to modify an existing program on the computyper 
for Flinco; that Mr. Johnson did, in fact, perform this 
function prior to the effective date of the lease, July 
29, 1965; and that Flinco was satisfied with said pro-
gramming of the computyper and accepted the 
machine for the purpose of the lease by its execution 
of the Completion Certificate on August 2, 1965. 
(Exhibit P-4). 
POINT III 
THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT PAID IN FULL ALL 
RENT DUE PRIOR TO CANCELLATION OF THE 
LEASE IS IMMATERIAL. 
The Lease Aqre8ment on the computyper, Ex-
hibits P-1 and P-2, and the Lease Agreement on the 
TCPC Unit, Exhibits P-1 and P-2, both provided in 
large, bold, black type at the botton of each page 
"THIS LEAS"E CANNOT BE CANCELLED." 
In Exhibit 1, paragraph 7, defendant-respondent 
Flinsco agreed, among other things, as follows: 
"If lessee shall fail to pay any rental as herein pro-
vided when the same is due and payable . . . the 
remaining unpaid lease payments shall be at once 
due and payable ... " 
The lease agreement provided for a lease of the 
equipment for a period of 60 months. Flinco had 
made payments for about 16 months before giving 
Security Leasing Company notice of cancellation on 
December 2, 1966. Therefore, in accordance with the 
terms of the ]ease agreement, Flinco became liable 
to Security Leasing Company for the remaining un-
paid rentals, less, of course, the salvage value of the 
leased equipment. 
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The fact that Flinco had made its rental pay-
ments to Security Leasing Company for 16 months 
prior to cancellation supports Security Leasing 
Company's position that a binding and enforceable 
lease agreement did, in fact, exist between the par-
ties and that Flinco accepted the benefits of said 
lease agreement by using the leased equipment for 
16 months and making monthly rental payments 
therefor. 
Thus, it is submitted that Flinco's cancellation 
of the lease agreement was in violation of the terms 
thereof and Security Leasing Company is entitled to 
recover damages for such breach. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the written instru-
ments executed by the parties constitute the final and 
complete expression of the lease agreement and 
should be enforced in accordance with the terms 
provided therein. By execution of the Lessee's State-
ment and Completion Certificate, Exhibit P-4, Flinco, 
the lessee, acknowledged that Security Leasing 
Company, the lessor, had fully performed its respons-
ibilities and obligations under the terms of the lease 
agreement and that Flinco was fully satisfied with 
the leased equipment and accepted the same for the 
purpose of the lease agreement. Flinco breached 
+hat lease agreement some 16 months after its effect-
14 
ive date, thereby causing damage to Security Leas-
ing Company for which judgment should be grant-
ed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HA YES, WATKISS, 
CAMPBELL & COWLEY 
STEPHEN G. MORGAN 
400 El Paso Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Security Leasing Company 
